The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The First Four Years by Mirabito, A. Jason
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE FIRST
FOUR YEARS
A. Jason Mirabito*
I. INTRODUCTION
As international trade has rapidly expanded in recent years, there has
been a simultaneous increase in the number of disputes arising from
additional commercial contacts across national borders. The legal,
economic, and technical problems in bringing a suit abroad, obtaining
evidence, getting a judgment, and enforcing that judgment are numer-
ous. It is logical then that businessmen have turned to another method,
commercial arbitration, to settle disputes among themselves. Arbitra-
tion has the advantages of being economical, expeditious, informal, and
impartial.' In many cases, the arbitrators, who are generally chosen by
the parties to the dispute, have expertise in the particular business the
dispute involves.2 Of course, once having obtained the arbitration of a
commercial dispute, the problem of getting the arbitral award en-
forced within the judicial system still exists.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the various legal regimes in
force that facilitate this enforcement and especially to consider the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 recently adopted by the United States, and
its effects upon the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
* Examiner, U.S. Patent Office. B.S., New York University, 1969; J.D., American Univer-
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For a look at the advantage arbitration could provide over adjudication by some not-so-
impartial courts see Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
While Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover stated that "[nlot only does this trade machi-
nery relieve the congestion in the courts, but it relieves the taxpayer from assessment for additional
facilities. In other words, business taxes itself to pay the cost of keeping commercial peace."
Foreword to AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, YEARBOOK OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN
THE UNITED STATES at vii (1927).
' The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 30,
1970, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Dec. 29, 1970)
[hereinafter cited as U.N. Cony.]. The United States did not sign the Convention until 12 years
after its adoption.
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II. ENFORCEMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF A TREATY
A. Enforcement in the United States
Early in the development of the common law, commercial arbitration
was regarded with disfavor by the law courts. In the 1746 case of Kill
v. Hollister," the English court of King's Bench stated that extrajudi-
cial attempts to solve disputes by arbitration tended to "oust" the juris-
diction of the courts. This fear led the courts to declare that an agree-
ment to settle future disputes by arbitration was revocable at any time
prior to the handing down of the arbitral award.' By the time the United
States separated from the mother country, the hostility to commercial
arbitration had been firmly established in American courts."
This antagonism persisted until the 1920's, when legislation served to
moderate the common law aversion to arbitration. Beginning with a
New York act in 1921,1 some 22 states adopted arbitration statutes,S
which have more or less overturned the common law view. On the
federal level, the Federal Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred to as the
1925 Act)9 was adopted in 1925. The 1925 Act provides for the specific
enforcement of arbitration agreements in the federal courts'0 and for the
staying of litigation instituted by one party in defiance of an arbitration
agreement between the parties." The 1925 Act also permits the federal
I Wils. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746); see Jones, History of Commercial Arbitration in
England and the United States: A Summary View, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 127
(M. Domke ed. 1958).
1 In his opinion in Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., Circuit Judge Jerome
Frank said:
Lord Campbell explained the English attitude as due to the desire of the judges, at a
time when their salaries came largely from fees, to avoid loss of income. Indignation
has been voiced at this suggestion; perhaps it is unjustified. Perhaps the true explanation
is the hypnotic power of the phrase, "oust the jurisdiction." Give a bad dogma a good
name and its bite may become as bad as its bark.
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983-84 (2d Cir. 1942).
1 See Tatsuuma Kisen K.K. v. Prescott, 4 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1925), in which the court held that
an arbitration clause was void and unenforceable when the clause required arbitration as a precon-
dition to a court action.
I N.Y. Civ. PRAC. §§ 1448-69 (McKinney 1963). This act makes agreements to arbitrate future
disputes valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract. Also, any court action brought despite such agreement is to be
stayed and referred to arbitration on the defendant's motion. See Contini, International Commer-
cial Arbitration, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 284 (1959).
1 Comment, International Commercial Arbitration under the United Nations Convention and
the Amended Federal Arbitration Act, 47 WASH. L. REV. 441, 444 n.8 (1972).
1 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
10 Id. § 4.
1Id. § 3.
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court in the district in which the award was rendered to confirm the
award. 2 However, the scope of the 1925 Act is not all-encompassing.
The 1925 Act is applicable only to arbitration clauses either incorpo-
rated into contracts which involve interstate or foreign commerce or
into maritime transactions. 3 A party desiring to utilize the 1925 Act
must also satisfy all the usual requirements to gain access to the federal
courts. Arbitration clauses in foreign contracts which do not affect the
"foreign commerce" of the United States are not within the scope of
the 1925 Act. 4 A contract involving only the commerce of foreign na-
tions, despite the fact that a citizen of the United States is a party, is
beyond the 1925 Act's limits. 15
The nexus between the 1925 Act and the doctrine of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins," that federal courts could not create substantive law in di-
versity cases, has not been constant. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.
of America 1' the Supreme Court held that the 1925 Act was not applic-
able to a diversity suit involving interstate or foreign commerce and that
the parties' rights were governed only by state law. However, a later
case from the Second Circuit, Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fab-
rics, Inc.," held that the 1925 Act was applicable to a diversity suit
involving interstate commerce and indicated that the 1925 Act had
created "a new body of federal substantive law affecting the validity and
interpretation of arbitration agreements."" In Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.20 the Supreme Court applied the
1925 Act to an arbitration clause in a contract and spoke approvingly
of the Lawrence analysis of federal substantive law.2' The Second Cir-
cuit also held in the Lawrence 2 and in Metro Industrial Painting Corp.
12 Id. § 9.
13 Id. § 2.
" The 1925 Act does not create independent federal subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the
normal diversity of citizenship or some other basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction must be
present. See Sturges and Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration under the
United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 580 (1952).
" The "Volsinio," 32 F.2d 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1929). See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RE-
PORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNATIONAL UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW 184, 202 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as A.B.A. REPORT].
t 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
' 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
" 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
,271 F.2d at 406.
388 U.S. 395 (1967).
21 See Coulson, Prima Paint: An Arbitration Milestone, 23 Bus. LAW. 241 (1967).
- 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). "This is a declaration of
national law equally applicable in state or federal courts." Id. at 407.
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v. Terminal Construction Co. 3 that the 1925 Act was equally applica-
ble in the federal and state courts.
The attitude of the United States toward the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards is now quite liberal." In Oilcakes & Oilseeds Trading
Co. v. Sinason Teicher Inter American Grain Corp.,25 an English party
obtained an arbitral award in the United Kingdom against a
nonparticipating American party and secured an English judgment on
that award. The New York action for enforcement was successful on
the award rather than on the English judgment. The court determined
that the award had not merged with the English judgment, enabling an
enforcement action to be brought on the award even though the judg-
ment itself was not entitled to recognition.
The court in Gilbert v. Burnstine determined that parties to a
contract, incorporating an agreement to arbitrate in London, had in
fact agreed to submit to the jurisdiction and arbitration laws of the
United Kingdom. The court stated that such an agreement was not
contrary to the public policy of the United States and that recognition
and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award rendered in the United
Kingdom should not be denied.
In a 1970 New York caser r involving two foreign corporations, the
court granted the defendant's motion for a stay pending the arbitration
of claims alleging breach of contract. In a subsequent New York case, 8
the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the basis of judgments
obtained in an Indian court which had confirmed two arbitral awards
in the plaintiff's favor. The court granted the motion and stated that
[under N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 5305 (McKinney Supp. 1969-1970)] a foreign
judgment is final and binding upon the parties to the extent that it grants
or denies recovery of a sum of money and that such a judgment is
enforceable. Thus, it appears that the courts of the United States will
readily enforce foreign arbitral awards and foreign judgments on these
awards.
- 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961). The court stated that if the
1925 Act is an exercise of the commerce and admiralty powers, the 1925 Act must apply not only
to litigation in the federal courts, but also to suits in state courts.
24 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 220, Reporter's Note, at 725-26 (1972).
Is 9 Misc. 2d 651, 170 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Supp. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 977, 183 N.Y.S.2d
838 (Ist Dep't 1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 852, 168 N.E.2d 708, 203 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1960).
2S 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931). "Consent is the factor which imparts power." Id. at 355,
174 N.E. at 706, 707.
" Joseph Muller Corp. v. Societe Anonyme de Gerance et D'Armement, 314 F. Supp. 439
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff d in part, 451 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1971).
n New Cent. Jute Mills Co. v. City Trade & Indus., Ltd., 65 Misc. 2d 653, 318 N.Y.S.2d 980
(Sup. Ct. 1971).
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The New York courts expanded this liberality in a 1969 case 9 in
which one court enforced a foreign award despite the fact that a bilateral
treaty on friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN) between the
United States and Germany applied only to final arbitrations. The court
stated that "[ilf our courts have heretofore extended broader recogni-
tion to foreign adjudications than required by the treaty, that recogni-
tion has not been abridged by the treaty. 30
B. Enforcement of American Arbitral Awards in Foreign Countries
1. Enforcement in Common Law Countries
In common law countries, courts generally enforce American arbitral
awards. As the law of the United States with regard to arbitration has
changed, British law has also turned from the harsh rule of Kill v.
Hollister l toward a policy of favoring commercial arbitration. In East
India Trading Co. v. Carmel Exports & Imports, Ltd.,32 the United
States importer had obtained a favorable award resulting from the
breach of a sales contract. The judgment of a New York supreme
court33 in 1950, confirming the award, was enforced in the United
Kingdom in 1952.
British courts will enforce both American awards and judgments on
those awards.34 In Bankers & Shippers Insurance Co. v. Liverpool
Marine & General Insurance Co.,35 suit was brought on a New York
award where the English party had refused to appoint an arbitrator. The
arbitration, having proceeded in his absence, ultimately was decided
against the English party. The court refused to enforce the award, but
the refusal was based solely on the ground that in appointing the arbitra-
tors and securing the appointment of an umpire, the New York corpora-
tion did not conform to the requirements of New York's arbitration act.
Otherwise, it appears that the court would have enforced the award.
" Von Engelbrechten v. Galvanoni & Nevy Bros., 59 Misc. 2d 721, 300 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1969), aff'd, 61 Misc. 2d 959, 307 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
', 59 Misc. 2d at 721, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
" I Wils. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746).
32 [1952] 2 Q.B. 439.
' East India Trading Co. v. Carmel Exports & Imports, Ltd., 97 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct.
1950), affd, 107 App. Div. 2d 757, 103 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (Ist Dep't 1951).
3, See T. BLANCO WHITE, RUSSELL ON THE LAW OF ARBITRATION (15th ed. 1952). "An award
which is complete and could be enforced in the country where it was made is enforceable in England
at common law." Id. at 262. See also Domke, Note, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 238 (1953).
24 Lloyd's List L.R. 85 (H.L. 1926), rev'g 21 Lloyd's List L.R. 86 (C.A. 1925), revg 19
Lloyd's List L.R. 335 (K.B. 1924).
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2. Enforcement in Countries of the Civil Law Tradition
One could have anticipated that other common law countries would
have an attitude similar to the United States with respect to arbitration.
In civil law nations the policy also seems to be that foreign arbitral
awards will be recognized and enforced.
In a recent German case,3" a dispute grew out of a contract between
a German manufacturer and an American firm. The American party
obtained a favorable award and attempted to get the award enforced in
Germany. The award was duly entered by the highest court, the
Bundesgerichtshof.Y
In a dispute between a New York manufacturer, Merry Hall & Co.,
and a French licensee, Gerstle, arbitration was held in New York City
under the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The French
licensee failed to appear and the tribunal decided against him. The New
York manufacturer filed the award with the French court, and following
an appeal by the French party, the award was enforced by the Court of
Appeals in Paris.8 The French Court referred to an affidavit from the
chairman of the arbitration board as proof of the validity of the award
under New York law. The Court did not examine the merits of the
case. Instead, it focused on whether the French party had the opportu-
nity of a fair hearing and whether enforcement of the award would
violate French public policy.39
In a Swiss case involving a dispute between an American company
and a Swiss company, the court enforced an award in favor of the
American party. In rejecting the Swiss company's allegation that arbi-
tration was not the exclusive remedy, the court stated that "it is within
the function of arbitral tribunals that they exclude the competence of
ordinary courts." 0
In the South American countries, with whom the United States does
a great deal of commercial trading, arbitral awards have been enforced.
In Revlon Products Corp. v. Salcedo Hermanos y Cia" an award ren-
dered against the Colombian party, followed by a New York supreme
[1961] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1067.
See Domke, American Arbitration Awards, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 399, 406 [hereinafter cited as
Domke].
Judgment of Oct. 2, 1963, [1963] J.C.P. 11. 13338, with note by Mctulsky; 1965 J. DROIT
INT'L 85, with note by Bredin. See also Holley, Enforcement of American Awards in France, 14
ARB. J. 83, 86 (1959).
" Domke, supra note 37, at 406.
10 [19561 55 Blitter f~ir Zircherische Rechtsprechung, No. 118, at 248.
11 72 GACETA JUDICIAL 1146 (1952). See also Hide Trading Corp. v. Field Echemigne Compania
Ltda., 68 GACETA JUDICIAL 139, No. 2087-88 [translated in 6 ARB. J. (n.s.) 159 (1951)].
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court judgment confirming the award, was enforced by the Supreme
Court of Justice of Colombia. The Court held that since the Colombian
party had voluntarily submitted to arbitration in New York under the
arbitral agreement, the national jurisdiction and public policy of Colom-
bia were not affected.
In Japan, United States judgments on arbitral awards have also been
enforced. In American President Lines, Ltd. v. C. Subra Kabushik" the
district court of Tokyo ordered the execution of a United States district
court judgment on an arbitral award unfavorable to the Japanese party.
On the other hand, the Philippine court in Eastboard Navigation, Ltd.
v. Juan Ysmael & Co." declined to enforce an arbitral award which
had been decided against the Philippine party but nevertheless enforced
a United States district court judgment on the award.
In most cases, arbitral awards and/or judgments on these awards
have been confirmed. One reason United States awards have not always
been enforced is lack of reciprocity, as demonstrated by the Spanish
case of Omni Fabrics, Inc. v. Hijo de Juan Artigas Alart S.A. 4 There
the court refused to enforce an award that had been rendered in New
York because of the lack of a showing of reciprocity in enforcing Span-
ish awards in the United States and because of the plaintiff's failure to
comply with Spanish procedural requirements. Being a civil law court,
the Spanish tribunal could have searched out an American law similar
to Spanish code provisions; however, since many of the American rules
relating to enforcement of arbitral awards are contained in the Ameri-
can law reporters, a Spanish judge would not be likely to find them. 41
The disparity in enforcing awards as opposed to judgments on the
awards calls for some unification of rules in this area. This has been
partly solved by bilateral and multilateral treaties.4
III. THE TREATY ERA
A. The 1923 German Protocol and 1927 Geneva Convention
Although arbitration machinery has gradually changed, some incon-
sistencies still exist. There have been efforts to resolve differences by
" See English translation in 6 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 203 (1962).
3 G.R. No. L-9090, Sept. 10, 1957.
11 See Monlean, Note, 1965 BULL. MADRID B. ASS'N 96, 231. See also Domke, supra note 37,
at 408-09.
See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. § 5301 (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975).
'3 For a discussion of the success of American parties in the enforcement of United States
awards abroad see Strauss, Inter-American Commercial Arbitration: Unicorn or Beast of Burden?,
21 Bus. LAW. 43 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Strauss].
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multilateral methods. The first practical realizations of this multilateral
approach came with the adoption of the 1923 Geneva Protocol on
Arbitration Clauses (hereinafter referred to as the Protocol)47 and the
1927 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards.4 8
Under the Protocol, the contracting states agreed that a compact to
arbitrate disputes between nationals of contracting states would be valid
and irrevocable.49 The Protocol was concerned mostly with the validity
of agreements to arbitrate future disputes between the parties to the
contract. Contracting states were given the option of a reservation in
which they could limit the arbitrability of a dispute to those that were
considered commercial." The Protocol provided for a staying of court
proceedings once arbitration had begun."A In addition, each state under-
took to execute awards made in its own territory "in accordance with
the provisions of its national laws of arbitration."52
The Convention overrode the article 3 provisions of the Protocol
which provided that an award would be enforced only in accordance
with the law of the forum state. Instead, the Convention required that
an arbitral award be recognized as binding and enforceable in accord-
ance with the national law agreed to by the parties.53 This liberal provi-
sion allowed for the enforcement of an award in accordance with either
the law of the place where the arbitration occurred or the law chosen
by the parties.
Certain tests must be satisfied under the Convention in order to get
one's award enforced by a contracting state. The award must arise from
a valid arbitration agreement; the award must have been handed down
by a properly constituted tribunal in conformity with local laws; it must
be final in the state where rendered; and it must not violate the public
policy of the country in which enforcement is sought. The burden of
meeting these criteria appears to be on the person seeking enforcement;
therefore, the person against whom enforcement is sought need only
rebut one of the various tests to be successful.54 This placing of the
,1 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, done Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 157 (effective July
28, 1924) [hereinafter cited as Geneva Prot.].
,1 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done Sept. 26, 1927, 92
L.N.T.S. 301 (effective July 25, 1929) [hereinafter cited as Geneva Cony.].
,1 Geneva Prot., supra note 47, art. 1.
50 Id.
Id. art. 4.
I d. art. 3.
13 Geneva Conv., supra note 48, art. 1.
11 See Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recog-
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burden of proof on what has turned out to be the unsuccessful party, in
conjunction with other weaknesses, has resulted in the Convention not
receiving widespread use. The other weaknesses include the following:
(1) the treaty is applicable only to controversies between parties subject
to the jurisdiction of different contracting states; (2) contracting states
have the power by reservation to exclude all noncommercial activities
from the scope of the Convention; (3) the validity of the agreement to
arbitrate is determined solely by local law; and (4) the enforcement of
awards rendered in a state not a party to the Convention is denied.5 The
United States was not a party to either Geneva agreement, since domes-
tic law at that time was not ready to accept an obligation to enforce
American arbitral awards, not to mention awards rendered in foreign
nations.
B. Arbitration Clauses in FCN Treaties
Although refusing to join in the multilateral Geneva efforts, the
United States did attempt to cover the enforcement of awards in foreign
countries through the vehicle of the bilateral treaty on friendship,
commerce, and navigation.56 These bilateral treaties can handle prob-
lems peculiar to two trading partners better than broad multilateral
agreements in which various states have differing problems and in
which a least common denominator approach must be utilized.
The first of such treaties to contain an arbitration clause was the 1946
FCN treaty with China. The clause57 provided that an agreement to
arbitrate would be given full faith and credit in both states, but that the
award from such arbitration would be recognized only in the state where
the award was rendered, a rather limited benefit.
In the United States-Ireland FCN treaty of 1950,11 the arbitration
clause stated that agreements to arbitrate "shall not be deemed unen-
forceable within the territories of the other Party . . . .No award...
shall be deemed invalid or denied effective means of enforcement...
merely on the grounds that the place where such award was rendered is
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1055 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Quigley].
Contini, International Commercial Arbitration, 8 AM. J. CoMP. L. 283, 289-90 (1959).
" The United States presently has FCN treaties containing arbitration clauses with the follow-
ing: Japan, Korea, the Republic of China, Iran, Israel, Haiti, Colombia, Ireland, Greece, Portugal,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands.
"' Treaty with China on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, art. VI, para. 4,
63 Stat. 1299 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1871 (effective Nov. 30, 1948).
" Treaty with Ireland on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950, [1950] I U.S.T.
785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155 (effective Sept. 14, 1950).
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outside such territories . . . ."" This last provision merely prohibited
a state from denying effect to an agreement or award solely because
of its foreign origin. However, it did not require enforcement. The most
liberal arbitration clause appeared in the 1956 United States-
Netherlands FCN treaty. 0 The treaty states that awards which are final
"shall be deemed conclusive in enforcement proceedings brought before
the courts of competent jurisdiction of either Party."'" This treaty then
goes beyond the principle of mere nondiscrimination to one of conclu-
siveness and imposes a duty to enforce the award.
In several American cases involving foreign arbitration, the courts
have enforced foreign awards because of the existence of a pertinent
FCN treaty. In Von Engelbrechten v. Galvanoni & Nevy Bros.," a
German national sought a judgment in New York to enforce an award
handed down by a German arbitration court. The court, enforcing the
award, relied upon the portion of the United States-Germany FCN
treaty 3 which states that arbitral awards "which are final and enforce-
able shall be deemed conclusive . . . in the courts . . . of either
Party."6 4 The case of Landegger v. Bayerische Hypotheken und Wechsel
Bank 65 was also concerned with the enforcement of a German arbitral
award pursuant to the United States-Germany FCN treaty. Citing
Von Engelbrechten, the court in Landegger confirmed the judgment
and enforced the German award, stating that it read the treaty as
"including among the German arbitration awards that will be . . .
enforced in the United States the class of awards which are 'final and
enforceable' under the laws of Germany. However, we do not read the
Treaty as limiting the category of awards enforceable here to this
class. ' 66 The court thus interpreted the treaty quite broadly and ex-
tended it to foreign arbitral awards, final or otherwise.67 In the case of
In the Matter of Fotochrome, Inc. ,68 the district court stated that, pur-
', Id. art. X.
0 Treaty with the Netherlands on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, March 27, 1956,
[1957] 2 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942 (effective Dec. 5, 1957).
61 Id. art. V, para. 2.
62 59 Misc. 2d 721, 300 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969), aff'd 61 Misc. 2d 959, 307
N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
1 Treaty with Germany on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, [1956] 2
U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 (effective July 14, 1956).
" Id. art. V1, para. 2.
" 357 F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
I d. at 694-95.
Comment, International Commercial Arbitration-Finality-United States Court Enjorces
Arbitral Award before Completion of Foreign Nullification Proceedings, 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 153 (1973) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.U. Comment].
11 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974),
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suant to the United States-Japan FCN treaty, 9 "conclusive Japanese
awards which do not violate our public policy are conclusive in this
country as well." 70
On the other hand, in a foreign case involving the United States-
Greece FCN treaty7' and the enforcement of an American award in
Greece, the Greek court declined to enforce the award. The notice of
the place and time of the arbitral proceeding required by New York
statute was declared to be too short and, therefore, against the public
policy of Greece. 2 Public policy is a permissible exception to the en-
forcement requirement. 3
The advantage of the FCN treaty approach in this field is that the
two parties, when they wish to amend their treaty to reflect modern
national policies on arbitration, have to deal only with the other party,
whereas in a multilateral treaty, renegotiation is much more difficult
simply because of the number of parties involved. The disadvantages are
that: (1) there are not very many of these treaties in existence, and (2)
they do little to promote uniformity of rules of international arbitration
law because of the differing treaty provisions.
C. Other International Mechanisms for Arbitration
1. The International Chamber of Commerce Program
International businessmen, perhaps because of the lethargy dis-
played by their governments in developing rules of arbitration, have set
up among themselves private means of dispute settlement. The best
known of these devices is the International Chamber of Commerce74
(ICC) with its Court of Arbitration. To have the ICC take jurisdiction
of a dispute, parties usually must provide for it in their contract, perhaps
using the ICC's model arbitration clause.75 Over 2,000 disputes have
been handled by the ICC since its inception in 1919. 71
" Treaty with Japan on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, April 12, 1953, [195312 U.S.T.
2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 (effective Oct. 30, 1953).
70 377 F. Supp. at 29-30.
Treaty with Greece on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 3, 1951, [1954] 2 U.S.T.
1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057 (effective Oct. 13, 1954) [hereinafter cited as FCN Treaty with Greece].
" No. 2106/1962 (Greece). For the text of the case in French see 16 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE
DROIT INT'L 356 (1964).
" FCN Treaty with Greece, supra note 71, art. VI, para. 2.
" See Cohn, The Rules of Arbitration of the I.C.C., 14 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 132 (1965).
" The model arbitration clause of the ICC states that "[aill disputes arising in connection with
the present contract shall be finally settled under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the
ICC by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the rules."
71 Tindall, International Commercial Arbitration, 7 AM. Bus. L.J. 65, 71 (1969).
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The court chooses the place of arbitration, and the law of the
chosen country governs the arbitration's procedural aspects not covered
by ICC rules. In a sense, arbitration is compulsory since once the parties
have agreed to arbitrate, the arbitration will commence and an award
will be rendered even if one party does not participate. The court itself
does not appoint arbitrators, but rather selects a group from which the
disputants can choose an arbitral panel. The panel's award must then
be approved by the court.
It has been estimated that 90 percent of the ICC awards have been
complied with voluntarily.77 In cases of noncompliance, either the na-
tional laws of the country in which the award is sought to be enforced
or that nation's treaty obligations determine whether compliance is
mandatory. Furthermore, the ICC's facilities are open not only to dis-
putes between private parties, but also to disputes between private par-
ties and governmental entities. Awards in the latter situation have been
enforced in the lower courts."9
The interest of the ICC in international arbitration led to its sup-
port of the 1923 and 1927 Geneva agreements, and finally to its proposal
to the United Nations for a new convention on the "Enforcement of
International Arbitral Awards." 79 This proposal culminated in the
adoption of the plans for a 1958 U.N. convention.
2. The European Convention on Arbitration
In their move towards political and economic unification, the Euro-
pean states have attempted to harmonize their laws on the enforcement
of arbitral awards. The 1957 European Convention for the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes" has a weak enforcement provision. If a party
refuses to comply with an award, the other party may apply to the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The Committee only
has the authority to make recommendations, and such recommenda-
tions must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Committee
membership."'
In 1961 the European Convention on International Commercial
n Eisenam, Arbitrations under the ICC Rules, 15 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 726, 734 (1966).
79 B6ckstiegel, Arbitration of Disputes Between States and Private Enterprises, 59 AM. J. INT'L
L. 579 (1962); Cohn, The Rule of Arbitration of the United States Economic Commission for
Europe, 16 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 945 (1967).
7g INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL
AWARDS (I.C.C. Brochure No. 174).
80 European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, adopted April 30, 1958, Europ.
T.S. No. 23.
91 K. SEIDE, A DICTIONARY OF ARBITRATION AND ITS TERMS 88 (1972).
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Arbitration"2 was approved. By 1969 some 14 states had ratified it, and
it became effective on January 7, 1974. This Convention has as signa-
tory states both Western and Eastern European States.8 3 The Conven-
tion deals with substantive rules regarding arbitration and also contains
detailed rules on the arbitration procedure, including rules governing
the place of arbitration and the appointment of arbitrators. The Con-
vention also applies to disputes between private parties and public
bodies such as state commercial trading organizations.
3. The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
In addition to the Geneva agreements, there has been one other
nonregional, multilateral effort to utilize arbitration to settle disputes:
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States (CSID).84 This treaty, which has
been ratified by the United States, is designed to settle disputes be-
tween a foreign investor of one state and a host state.8 The CSID
sets up, arbitration machinery in the Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes, which is under the auspices of the World Bank.
The CSID has received much support from capital-exporting states
like the United States who seek to protect the overseas holdings of their
national investors. The CSID differs from both the Geneva agreements
and the FCN treaties in that it does not apply to disputes between two
private parties.
One unusual feature of the CSID is its voluntary aspect. It does
not establish a system of compulsory arbitration. The fact that a state
has ratified the CSID does not bind it to utilize the Centre, since
consent in each dispute is the keynote of the CSID. Such consent may
be expressed (within an agreement to arbitrate) in the investment con-
tract between the concerned state and the foreign investor, or when the
dispute arises, consent may be given via mutual agreement of the par-
ties. Once the award has been rendered, it is binding on the parties as a
2 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, done April 21, 1961, 484
U.N.T.S. 349.
0 These countries include the following: the USSR, Ukrainian SSR, Romania, Yugoslavia,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Belorussian SSR, Austria, Bulgaria, Poland, France, and the Federal
Republic of Germany.
I Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, Aug. 27, 1965, [19661 1 U.S.T 1271, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter
cited as CSID].
M' Article 25(l) of the Convention states that its Centre has jurisdiction over "any legal dispute
arising directly out of investment, between a Contracting State . . . and a national of another
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre."
1975] 483
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
final adjudication, 6 and contracting states are required to equate a
CSID award with a final judgment of its own courts.87 One advantage
of the CSID is that it does not oblige the domestic court to enforce
awards rendered under the authority of a foreign tribunal, but rather
obligates the domestic court to enforce an award from an independent
international body.
Unfortunately, no Latin American countries are among the 68
nations that have ratified the CSID. The CSID was in many ways
aimed at Latin America in an attempt to find some international machi-
nery to settle disputes involving investors from capital-exporting coun-
tries. Latin America, for historical and political reasons, has long
distrusted the use of arbitration. This attitude is evidenced by the fact
that only one Latin American country, Nicaragua, has an FCN treaty
with the United States guaranteeing the reciprocal enforcement of arbi-
tral agreements and awards.8 9 The CSID may also be considered a
failure, at least presently, since by 1972 the Centre had been asked to
arrange arbitration in only one dispute. 0
4. AID and GA TT Arbitration
In 1961 the Agency for International Development (AID) placed an
arbitration clause in its contract of guarantees under the Foreign Assis-
tance Act." A year later, Congress gave the President the power to
suspend aid to any country which nationalized or expropriated property
belonging to American citizens. Congress provided, however, that aid
would not be cut off if the foreign government took remedial steps, such
as submitting the underlying dispute to conciliation or arbitration. 2
Also, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)," article
" Id. art. 53(1) states that the award "shall be binding and shall not be subject to appeal or to
any other remedy except those provided by this Convention."
31 Id. art. 54(l) states that "[a] Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such
an award in or through its federal courts and may provide that such courts should treat the award
as if it were a final judgment of the courts of the constituent state."
u See Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America, I I VA. J. INT'L L. 256,
262 (1971).
"O Treaty with Nicaragua on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, [1958] 1
U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024 (effective May 24, 1958).
" 6 INT'L CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES ANN. REP. 14 (1971-1972).
This arbitration proceeding involved the government of Morocco and two private companies:
Holiday Inns S.A., a Swiss corporation, and Occidental Petroleum, a United States corporation.
* Strauss, supra note 46, at 49.
3 Id. at 48.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. (5) & (6) (1947),
T.I.A;S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S. (effective Jan. 1, 1948). The agreement, as adopted by the
United States, can also be found in 19 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1970).
[Vol. 5: 471
UNITED NATIONS ARBITRAL CONVENTION
23, provides for conciliation as a method of dispute settlement between
the contracting states who are parties to it. Article 23 provides that a
state may "with a view to satisfactory adjudication of the matter, make
written representations . . . to the other Contracting Party . . . ." By
1959 there had been many such representations under article 23.11
IV. THE ADOPTION OF THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS-HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND
Since little use was made of either of the Geneva agreements and since
there had been an increase in international commercial contacts,
support developed for the adoption of a new multilateral convention on
commercial arbitration. In 1953 the ICC asked the U.N. Economic and
Social Council to draw up a convention dealing with the enforcement
of arbitral awards rendered in other countries. The Council in 1954
established an ad hoc committee to study the ICC's proposed conven-
tion." After giving consideration to the ICC's proposals, the Council
produced its own draft convention, 6 which it then circulated among
member states for their comments. Encouraged by the response, the
Council called a conference to draft a convention on the subject and to
consider the "possible measures for increasing the effectiveness of arbi-
tration in the settlement of private law disputes . . ... " Representa-
tives of 45 nations convened from May 20 to June 10, 1958, to work
out the details of such a convention. In its Final Act9" on June 10, 1958,
the conference adopted the Convention it had drafted. Ten nations
signed the Convention on that day, followed by 13 other nations soon
thereafter."
However, the United States failed to sign at that time'00 and did
94 See Hollis, Dispute Settlement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION, A ROAD TO WORLD WIDE COOPERATION 77 (M. Domke
ed. 1959).
U.N. ECOSOC Res. 520, 17 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/2596 (1954).
U.N. Doc. E/AC.42/SR.0/3 (1955).
:7 U.N. ECOSOC Res. 604, 21 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. I, at 6, U.N. Doc. 2889 (1956).
" U.N. CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, FINAL ACT, U.N. Doc.
E/C.26/9/Rev. I (1958).
" See Contini, International Commercial Arbitration, 8 AM. J. COMp. L. 283, 289 (1959).
* The reasons given for nonparticipation by the United States were as follows:
I. The convention, if accepted on a basis that avoids conflict with State laws and
judicial procedures, will confer no meaningful advantages on the United States.
2. The convention, if accepted on a basis that assures such advantage, will override the
arbitration laws of a substantial number of States and entail changes in State and
possibly Federal court procedures.
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not ratify the Convention until 1970. The United States delegation to
the Convention had recommended that this country not accede to the
Convention for two reasons: (1) adherence to the Convention would
confer no real benefits to this country, and (2) the Convention would
conflict with many state arbitration laws. It was also argued that com-
mercial arbitration did not lie "within the traditional limits of the treaty
power."101
The American delegation participated in the negotiation of the
treaty, but its participation was minimal since it took no part in any
of the three working sessions, pursuant to its instructions to participate
"in a limited way."' 02 The American delegation had voted in favor of
allowing the committee of experts to consider the ICC's draft proposal
"as a gesture of support for arbitration generally but did not seek repre-
sentation on the committee."103 This was unfortunate since the United
States eventually adhered to this Convention and had thus precluded
itself, by its lack of participation in the drafting stage, from arguing for
clauses favorable to this country.
Although the official American position was not in favor of ratifica-
tion, there was always substantial support for ratification, notably with-
in the American Bar Association. At the annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Bar Association in 1922, the Committee on Commerce, Trade, and
Commercial Law submitted a model treaty on arbitration for negotia-
tion with foreign nations. The treaty was unanimously approved by the
full membership. 104 The draft treaty contained a provision stating that
an agreement to arbitrate would be valid, enforceable, and irrevoca-
ble. 1°5 The treaty also stated that arbitral awards made within the terri-
tory of a contracting state would be entitled to full faith and credit in
the courts of other contracting states, subject only to collateral attack
3. The United States lacks a sufficient domestic legal basis for acceptance of an
advanced international convention on this subject matter.
4. The convention embodies principles of arbitration law which would not be desirable
for the United States to endorse.
UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION, OFFICIAL REPORT 2 (1958) [hereinafter cited as U.S. DEL. REP.].
1,1 Id. at 23. This position was later reiterated by Secretary of State John Dulles: "I do not
believe that treaties should, or lawfully can, be used to circumvent the constitutional procedures
established in relation to what are essentially matters of domestic concern." Hearings on S.J. Res.
I Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., at 825 (1953).
102 U.S. DEL. REP., supra note 100, at 2.
"0 Id. at 1.
"* 47 AM. BAR Assoc. ANN. REP. 288 (1922); for the text of the proposed treaty see A.B.A.
REPORT, supra note 15, at 260-322.
103 Id. at 260, art. 1.
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on the grounds of fraud, bad faith, etc." 6 Finally, the treaty required
that suitable jurisdiction be conferred on the courts to enforce arbitral
agreements and awards. 1' 7
In 1960, two years after the drafting of the Convention, the ABA
Committee on the International Unification of Private Law recom-
mended accession to the treaty by the United States and certain changes
in the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act in order to implement the Conven-
tion. 08 In September 1960, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a
resolution strongly recommending accession to the Convention and
changes in the 1925 Act. 09 By that time the ABA had received a multi-
tude of letters from American businessmen favoring accession to the
Convention.
The weight of American opinion favoring ratification finally caused
the administration to act. In 1968, at the request of Secretary of State
Rusk, President Johnson urged the Senate to recommend accession to
the 1958 Convention."' The submission was referred to the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations."' The President's letter of transmittal
recommended that American accession should occur only after the pas-
sage of domestic legislation needed to implement the Convention." 3 On
October 4, 1968, the Senate consented to accession by a 57-0 vote,
subject to changes necessary in federal law. The supplemental legislation
was in the form of a bill adding a new chapter 2 to the 1925 Act." ' The
enactment was signed into law on July 31, 1970, subject to formal
accession by the United States to the Convention. This instrument was
filed with the United Nations on September 30, 1970, and the Conven-
tion came into force 90 days afterwards, making this country the 37th
country to ratify the Convention.
Among the countries that have ratified the Convention are the major
trading partners of the United States, including France, Italy, West
Germany, Japan, and some Communist states such as the USSR,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania. Conspicuously missing from
I0 d. art. 2.
I ld. art. 3.
Id. at 194-236.
09 The proposed amendments of the ABA to titles 9 and 28 of the United States Code are
available in S. EXEC. Doc. No. E., 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 27-28 (1968) [hereinafter cited as S.
EXEC. Doc. No. El.
I1 d. at 28-42.
Id. at I.
" S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
n' S. EXEC. Doc. No. E., supra note 109.
n, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970).
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the list"' are most of the Latin American countries; Ecuador and Mex-
ico are the only two which have ratified the Convention. This is not sur-
prising, however, in view of the Latin American attitude concerning
arbitration. Another non-ratifying nation is the United Kingdom,
although its accession had been recommended." 6 Due to the large
number of participating countries, this Convention could be invaluable
in settling transnational arbitral problems. The next section will discuss
how the Convention proposes to meet this task.
V. THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS-A CURRENT ANALYSIS
A. Provisions of the Convention
Under article I, the Convention is made applicable to a state other
than the state where the recognition and enforcement of such awards
are sought" 7 and also to awards not considered domestic by the enforc-
ing state. The last phrase was inserted and supported on the ground that
it was the place of arbitration that determined whether an award was
foreign. For example, under Belgian law an award rendered in Belgium
under the law of a foreign country is considered a Belgian award; an
award rendered in another country under the law of Belgium would be
considered a foreign award. However, an award made in France under
foreign law is regarded as a nondomestic award."'
Article I, paragraph 2, states that an arbitral award must be one that
has arisen out of a voluntary agreement to arbitrate, whether before ad
hoc or permanent arbitral bodies. Paragraph 3 permits a contracting
state, by submitting a proper reservation, to declare that it will apply
the Convention "on the basis of reciprocity." A second permitted reser-
vation is the commercial limitation that a state may choose to apply the
Convention only to disputes "arising out of legal relationships .. .
which are considered as commercial."" 9 These limitations were inserted,
" The states that have ratified the Convention are: Austria, Bulgaria, Belorussian SSR, Cam-
bodia, the Central African Republic, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Finland, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Madagascar,
Morocco, the Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Switzer-
land, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, the United Arab
Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Mexico.
" The recommendation came from THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMM., FIFTH REPORT
1515 (1961). See Cohn, The 5th Report of the Private International Law Committee, 25 MOD. L.
REV. 449 (1962).
'" U.N. Cony., supra note 3, art. I(!).
" See S. EXEc. Doc. No. E., supra note 109, at 18.
"' U.N. Conv., supra note 3, art. 1(3).
[Vol. 5: 471
UNITED NATIONS ARBITRAL CONVENTION
among other reasons, for the benefit of states like Belgium where arbi-
tration is limited to commercial transactions. Unless a state has availed
itself of the reciprocity reservation, it would be obligated to apply the
Convention to awards rendered in a foreign state, whether or not that
state is a contracting state to the Convention. The United States and
24 other countries have adopted both these reservations.
Another part of the Convention, article II, deals with agreements to
arbitrate and requires each contracting state to recognize an agreement
in writing'"0 to arbitrate disputes. It is unclear what kinds of agreements
the contracting states are required to recognize. During the treaty's
negotiations, the German delegate had proposed that language be in-
cluded to the effect that the recognition of arbitral agreements must be
related to an award capable of enforcement under the Convention.",
Nevertheless, the word "enforce," pertaining to the arbitral agreement,
was omitted from article II. Thus, it appears that a state is not required
to enforce specifically the arbitration agreement by ordering the recalci-
trant party to arbitrate. Article II further limits the recognition duty of
a state to matters "capable of settlement by arbitration,"'12 due to the
fact that in some countries certain matters are not resolved by arbitra-
tion.'2 In the United States, for instance, disputes affecting the title to
realty are not arbitrable. Much latitude is then left to a nation or a
tribunal in deciding whether the question is capable of arbitration, and
for this reason, article II is somewhat weak. Article II also requires a
state to "refer the parties to arbitration."'' However, this article does
not relate to agreements providing for a stay of court proceedings for
awards capable of enforcement.
Article III pertains to the basic treaty obligation; that is, the duty of
each state to "recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them
in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the
award is relied upon.'' . The states have been left free to set up
different procedures for the enforcement of foreign and domestic
awards, as long as they do not go beyond the point where they impose
substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the
enforcement of awards under the Convention than they impose on the
12 Id. art. II(I).
t21 J. HAIGHT, CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN AWARDS
27 (1958).
'2 U.N. Cony., supra note 3, art. II(1).
M2 S. EXEC. Doc. No. E., supra note 109, at 19.
12, U.N. Cony., supra note 3, art. 11(3).
'2.1 Id. art. III.
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recognition and enforcement of domestic awards. The Convention pro-
hibits states from treating foreign awards substantially less favorably
than they treat domestic awards, but it does not indicate how favorably
foreign awards are in fact to be treated.1'1 Presumably by ratifying the
Convention, a state which has no rule by which even domestic awards
can be enforced must now provide some enforcement procedure for
those awards coming within the Convention.
Article IV sets forth the procedure which the proponent of an award
must follow to get his award recognized and enforced in the contracting
state. To conform with that procedure, he must: (1) file an application
for recognition and enforcement of the award with the competent au-
thority, (2) submit the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy,
(3) supply the arbitration award or a certified copy, and (4) provide a
translation of the award and the agreement.' This simple method by
which the proponent of the award can get the award recognized and
enforced contrasts sharply with the way in which the 1927 Geneva
agreements imposed a heavy burden of proof on the proponent seeking
enforcement of the award.1i 7
The grounds under which the defendant can challenge the enforce-
ment of an award are detailed in article V. Paragraph l(a) of article V
states that an award may be refused recognition and enforcement where
the agreement to arbitrate was included under the law the parties had
agreed would be applicable, or under the law of the place where the
award was rendered. Thus, it appears that the choice of law of the
parties should be incorporated in the arbitration agreement. There
should be no enforcement of an award against a party who did not agree
to arbitrate.
Article V, paragraph l(b), inserts a due process requirement into the
Convention, and it applies where the defendant was not given proper
notice of the arbitration proceedings or of the appointment of an arbi-
trator. On the other hand, paragraph l(c) permits a challenge to en-
forcement on the grounds that the award was rendered on a dispute not
contemplated within the original agreement to arbitrate or that the
arbitral decision was beyond the scope of the dispute which was submit-
ted. This paragraph also states that if the arbitrable matters agreed
upon can be separated from those not arbitrable, recognition and en-
forcement will be given to the arbitrable matters only.
2 Quigley, supra note 54, at 1066.
I Quigley, Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 58 A.B.A.J. 821, 824 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Quigley, Convention].
"' See notes 48-55 supra and accompanying text.
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Paragraph l(d) relates to the correctness of the arbitral procedure
and the composition of the arbitral tribunal. The defendant must prove
that the tribunal's composition or the procedure used was not in accord
with the arbitration agreement or not in accord with the law of the
country in which arbitration took place. Proving this last point involves
proving elements of foreign law. Generally, this will be a heavy burden
for the defendant to sustain.'
A similar defense is allowed under paragraph l(e) when the award has
not yet become binding or has been set aside or suspended by a compe-
tent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that
award has been made. The most difficult question an enforcing court
will have to decide is how to handle an award which has not been set
aside and is still subject to review in the rendering state. The term
"binding" was used in place of "final" because of the difficulty in
ascertaining the legal meaning of the latter. 9 The effect of using "bind-
ing" is that the court in which enforcement is sought must determine
what the word means in the jurisdiction of the court in which the award
is rendered.
Paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) differ from paragraph 1 in that paragraph
I requires that the defendant arguing against enforcement raise the
various defenses contained therein. In paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b), the
enforcing court may, in its own discretion, take certain action. Accord-
ing to paragraph 2(a), the court can raise the defense that in the enforc-
ing country such subject matter is not arbitrable, and under paragraph
2(b) enforcement can be denied if the award rendered is contrary to the
enforcing forum's public policy. Of course, no real definition can be
given to the term "public policy"; so there is some room for abuse of
this provision (via political and economic reasons) in the enforcing
forum.
Article VI allows the enforcing court to stay its enforcement proceed-
ings if a party has applied for a setting aside or suspension of the award
in the rendering country. This article complements the defense in article
V, paragraph l(e), that the award is not yet binding or has been set
aside.
Article XI obligates federal states, with respect to those articles of the
Convention which come within the authority of the individual states, to
recommend implementation of the Convention to their state govern-
ments. By accession, the United States is fully bound by the Convention,
"' Quigley, Convention, supra note 126, at 825.
'" See S. EXEC. Doc. No. E., supra note 109 at 21.
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and other contracting states cannot refuse enforcement of American
awards on the grounds that some of our states have antiquated arbitra-
tion laws. 30
Finally, article XIV contains a reciprocity clause which provides that
a contracting state will not be entitled to avail itself of the Convention
against another contracting state except to the extent that it is itself
bound. This article gives a contracting state the right to deny enforce-
ment because of another state's reservations, such as a commercial
reservation.
B. The United States Implementing Legislation
In drafting the domestic implementing legislation contained in the
1970 Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred to as the 1970 Act), 13 ' the
path taken was to add a new chapter 2 to the original 1925 Act. All
provisions of the 1925 Act are applicable to actions under the 1970 Act
to the extent the earlier act does not conflict with the later act or with
the Convention. Section 201 of chapter 2 of the 1970 Act states that the
Convention shall be enforced in accordance with sections 202 through
208.
Section 202 specifies which agreements or awards fall within the
Convention. An agreement or award arising out of a legal relationship
exclusively between two American citizens is not enforceable unless
there is a reasonable nexus between them and a foreign nation. Also, in
this section the United States exercises the "commercial" reservations
permitted under article 1(3) of the Convention. Commerce is already
defined in section 1 of the 1925 Act; therefore, in the 1970 Act it was
only necessary to expand the definition of commerce to include foreign
commerce. In the opinion of the State Department, this reservation is
applicable both to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards
under article 1(3) of the Convention and to the recognition of an arbitra-
tion agreement under article 11.132
As already noted, the United States has ratified the Convention sub-
ject to the "reciprocity" reservation of article 1(3). However, the imple-
menting law does not mention how this reciprocity is to be applied, and
this is needed since this country wishes to apply a reciprocity stan-
'" Quigley, Convention, supra note 126, at 826.
3 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970).
1'2 See Comment, United States Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention: United States
Accession, 2 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 67, 75 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
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dard. 33 Since there are no official guidelines, the government is free
to act as it desires on the reciprocity reservation. 134
Section 203 grants original jurisdiction over actions falling within the
Convention to the federal district courts, regardless of the amount in
controversy. This last provision was necessary since section 4 of the
1925 Act'35 was applicable only if the $10,000 federal jurisdictional
amount was present. Another important section is section 205, which
allows the defendant in an enforcement action to remove the action
from a state to a federal district court. This is a necessary provision
since the federal legislation has placed international arbitration with
respect to the coverage of the Convention within federal court jurisdic-
tion.
Section 206 states that a court may, in accordance with the arbitra-
tion agreement, require that arbitration be held either within or outside
this country, and appoint arbitrators. The court, in its discretion under
section 206, might well prefer that arbitration be held in this country to
protect the American party or might decide that American arbitrators
are more qualified to decide a particular disputed subject. 3 A "statute
of limitations" is enumerated in section 207, which provides a 3-year
limit for a party to apply to the competent court for confirmation of
the award. This section also states that the court must confirm the
award unless an article V defense is proved.'37
C. Cases Involving the Convention
1. Cases in the United States
Although the Convention has been in effect in this country for 4 years,
there have been few cases in which it has been applied. Landegger v.
Bayerische Hypotheken und Wechsel Bank,'38 a 1972 case, considered
the question of the enforcement of an arbitral award involving an Amer-
ican citizen and a German party, whose state had also ratified the
Convention. However, the court failed to mention the Convention or its
applicability to the case, and enforced the award on the basis of the
"I S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 9 (1968); S. EXEC. Doc. No. E., supra
note 109, at I.
"' Comment, supra note 132, at 77.
' 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
131 Comment, supra note 132, at 79.
Ir A good treatment of the relation between the 1925 and 1970 Arbitration Acts appears in
Comment, International Commercial Arbitration Under the United Nations Convention and the
Amended Federal Arbitration Statute, 47 WASH. L.R. 441 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Wash.
Comment].
Im 357 F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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FCN treaty between Germany and the United States."'
In Island Territory of Curaqao v. Solitron Devices, Inc.4' the Con-
vention was applied only in the lower court decision. Solitron, an elec-
tronics concern, had entered into a contract with Curaqao, a part of the
Netherlands, which itself had acceded to the Convention. The contract
provided that any disputes arising from the contract would be settled
by arbitration, that the laws of the Netherlands Antilles would be appl-
icable to the agreement, and that the decision of the arbitral tribunal
would be final. Solitron attempted to breach the agreement and declined
to arbitrate. The arbitration proceeded without Solitron and an award
in favor of Curaqao was rendered, finding Solitron in breach of contract.
Curaqao then brought the award to its own courts for enforcement, and
a judgment was entered in its favor.
Referring to the Convention, Solitron advanced several reasons why
the award should not be enforced by the American court: (1) the con-
tract with Curaqao was "governmental," and the Convention applied
only to "commercial" matters; (2) the award was not final and was
contrary to American public policy; and (3) the contract and arbitration
agreement were terminated by impossibility of performance, and as a
result there was a lack of jurisdiction over Solitron in Curaqao. Solitron
also claimed that the award could not be enforced under article 53 of
the New York statutet4 0 ' because the Convention had preempted that
statute. Finally, Solitron stated that the whole matter was governed by
the CSID, which had been ratified by the United States and the Neth-
erlands.' 4
As to the first point, the appeals court made no comment. However,
the lower court stated that research had failed to reveal what was meant
by "commercial" as used in the Convention and concluded that it was
meant to exclude matrimonial and domestic awards, political awards,
and the like.' The court then stated that, judging by any text the
10 It is possible that the court construed the Convention as inapplicable because the date the
Convention came into force was after the date the contract between the parties was executed. The
Convention came into force for the United States on February 2, 1971, and for iGermany on
September 23, 1961. However, the contract calling for arbitration was made on January-30,-961,
before the Convention came into force in either country. In the preparations for the Conveniof N
it was never discussed whether its provisions could be applied retroactively. It appears thatithif>.
position of the United States, upon which the judge might have relied in not applying the Conven-
tion, is that treaties have no retroactive effect. See N.Y.U. Comment, supra note 67, at 159-60.
11 356 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973).
,w. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. §§ 5301-09 (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975).
"' 489 F.2d at 1317.
112 356 F. Supp. at 13.
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contract in question was "clearly" commercial"' and cited one author-
ity who declared that commerce was meant to be used in the broadest
sense.' Finally, the court said that even if it were not commercial, the
Curaqao judgment could itself be enforced in New York, since the
applicable New York statute had no commercial limitation. It is sub-
mitted that the implementing legislation should give some information
as to what the commerce reservation means, whether it applies to quasi-
governmental awards or matrimonial awards etc. This needed clarity
can be easily achieved by amendments to the 1970 Act.
Solitron's second argument was that the award was not final and was
contrary to American public policy. After summarily dismissing the
public policy grounds,"5 the court said that the possibility of appellate
review vanished when Solitron did not attempt to have the award an-
nulled in Curaqao within the 3-month period set out under Curagaoan
law; so for all purposes, the award was final.'
Solitron's third point was that in the contract between itself and
Curaqao, jurisdiction was conferred by consent of the parties and by
Solitron's fixing as its contractual domicile the office of a notary public
in Curaqao. Solitron asserted that this consent and domicile were re-
voked before the arbitration took place." 7 The court stated that this
contention was "frivolous because [Solitron] had agreed .. to submit
to arbitration in Curagao and that the laws of the Antilles should be
applicable.""'
Solitron then argued that the judgment of the Curagaoan court could
not be enforced under article 53 of the New York law. The court re-
jected this argument, stating that "[tihe Convention in no way purports
to prevent states from enforcing foreign money judgments . ...
The court went on to state that the Convention is applicable only to
foreign awards, not judgments, and thus New York was not prohibited
from enforcing the Curaqaoan judgment on the award in question. Soli-
tron's final argument was that the applicable convention in this case was
the CSID. However, the CSID is applicable only when there is an
agreement to submit disputes to the CSID Centre, and such agreement
was obviously lacking.
' Id. at 13.
" Quigley, Convention, supra note 126, at 823.
M, 489 F.2d at 1322.
"Id. at 1323.
I7 d. at 1320.
SId. at 1317.
1,3 Id. at 1318.
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The court concluded by holding that the Curaqaoan judgment was to
be enforced under the New York statute, affirming the district court on
this point. The appellate court shied away from affirming the lower
court on the grounds of the Convention, stating that "we need not
determine the correctness of the alternative ground advanced by the
district court that the award was enforceable under the Convention
... ,,15 It is not evident why the court did not affirm on these grounds,
since throughout the opinion the court continually demonstrated that
the Convention was applicable and rejected Solitron's defenses as to the
application of the Convention. Perhaps the court felt more secure in
deciding the case on the basis of "domestic law."
A recent case, In the Matter of Fotochrome, Inc.,' also considered
the Convention. In this case the federal district court reversed the deci-
sion of the bankruptcy court. Following a dispute, the American and
Japanese parties were awaiting a decision from the Commercial Arbi-
tration Association in Japan. The American party filed a chapter 2
arrangement in the Eastern District of New York, and the bankruptcy
judge then restrained all other claims against the debt. Subsequent to
the actions of the bankruptcy judge, the arbitration panel handed down
its award, which in Japan has the force of a judgment and is conclusive
and final between the parties.5 2
The bankruptcy judge refused to recognize the award because of his
restraining order and ruled that the Japanese claim be tried de novo in
the bankruptcy court. The Japanese party appealed and supported its
right to enforcement by invoking the Convention and the United States-
Japan FCN treaty.' Reversing the bankruptcy court, the federal dis-
trict court stated that under the Convention, foreign arbitral awards
"are treated much like a judgment under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause .. ."I" The court noted that the United States had acceded
to the Convention more than 4 years after the contract involved was
signed and shortly after the award in Japan was rendered. It then stated
that "it is likely the treaty controls enforcement actions commenced
after the effective date of the Convention, even if the foreign proceedings
and award preceded the Convention . . . . 55 The court cited one au-
150 Id. at 1323.
" 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
"1 Id. at 33.
"5 Treaty with Japan on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, April 2, 1953, [1953] 2 U.S.T.
2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 (effective Oct. 10, 1953).
" 377 F. Supp. at 30.
I d. at 30.
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thority in support of this position,' although there was also some au-
thority contra.'57 The court then said that the Convention requires
American courts to grant the same finality to the award in this country
as had been granted in Japan."" The court held that the Japanese award
was entitled to confirmation proceedings in the United States if the
award could not be defeated by the defendant using one of the article 5
defenses of the Convention.'59 The issues in the underlying dispute were
thus res judicata. The court then found that the treaty took preced-
ence. 160 Citing the Curacao case,' the court held that the Japanese
award, since it was the equivalent of a Japanese judgment, could also
be enforced under the New York statute on the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign-country money judgments [N.Y. Civ. Prac. §§ 5301-09
(McKinney Supp. 1973-1974)].162
In 1974 the Supreme Court decided the case of Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co."3 The action was brought by an American company,
Alberto-Culver, against Scherk, a German citizen. Alberto-Culver had
purchased ownership rights in Scherk's trademarks. The contract of sale
stated that any dispute which arose from the agreement would be settled
by arbitration before the ICC in Paris, France. Since the trademark
rights so transferred were subject to substantial encumbrances, Alberto-
Culver offered to rescind the contract. Upon Scherk's refusal, an action
was brought for damages in the federal district court in Illinois, in which
Alberto-Culver alleged violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.114 Scherk then filed a motion to stay the action
pending arbitration in Paris pursuant to the parties' agreement. The
district court relied upon Wilko v. Swan,"6 5 which held that an arbitra-
tion agreement did not preclude a purchaser of a security from seeking
a judicial remedy in lieu of arbitration. This was because section 14 of
the Securities Act of 19335.1 provided that the right to select a judicial
forum could not be waived under the Securities Act.' Distinguishing
Wilko and reversing the decision below, the Supreme Court stated that:
"' Quigley, Convention, supra note 126, at 822.
"s N.Y.U. Comment, supra note 67, at 159-60.
l 377 F. Supp. at 30.
j Id. at 33.
I6 d. at 34.
1 489 F.2d 1313, 1319 (2d Cir. 1973).
l 377 F. Supp. at 33.
' 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
IS 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
"u 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
16.1 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970).
" 417 U.S. at 514.
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An agreement to arbitrate . . . [is a] forum-selection clause that
posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in
resolving the dispute ....
[ .. T]he agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising out of their
international commercial transaction is to be respected and enforced
by the federal courts in accord with the explicit provision of the Arbi-
tration Act."6 7
The Court states further that "[w]ithout reaching the issue whether the
Convention . . .would require of its own force that the agreement to
arbitrate be enforced . . . we think that this country's . . . ratification
of the Convention . . provide[s] strongly persuasive evidence of con-
gressional policy consistent with the decision we reach today.'" 8 Thus,
the Court basically ignored the Convention and enforced the agreement
to arbitrate on other grounds. The court of appeals in the Curacao
decision had also ignored the Convention by enforcing the foreign judg-
ment on the award under the applicable New York law and not reaching
the question of whether the award involved in Curacao could be en-
forced under the United Nations Convention.6 9
In a strong dissent in this five-to-four decision, Justice Douglas stated
that article 11(3) of the Convention requires a court to refer the parties
to arbitration unless the agreement cannot be arbitrated. Since the
transaction between Scherk and Alberto-Culver involved securities, the
1934 Securities Exchange Act invalidated the arbitration agreements
to the extent that the agreement purported to prevent a defrauded
party from seeking relief in federal court. 70
2. Foreign Cases Involving the Convention
The Convention has been effective for some time in other countries,
and several cases have been decided relating to enforcement of awards
under it. A decision in Switzerland, J.A. van Walsum N.V. v.
Chevalines S.A.,' dealt with the written form of a Dutch arbitration
agreement. An Austrian case"' upheld the presentation of a Dutch
award to the Austrian court when enforcement was sought, and a Ger-
Ie Id. at 519-20.
'' Id. at 521 n.15.
'" Island Territory of Curagao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd
489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973).
110 417 U.S. at 527-28.
"1 64 Revue Suisse de Jurisprudence 86 (Tribunal de Gen~ve 1967).
172 Judgment of Nov. 17, 1967, 9 Zeitschrift fOr Rechtsvergleichung 123 (Sup. Ct.).
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man case' dealt with the validity of an unsigned arbitration agree-
ment.
The Convention was applied in Compagnie de Saint Gobain v. Ferti-
lizer Corp. of India, Ltd. by the French court on May 15, 1970, and
the Indian High Court of Delhi on August 28, 1970. An award rendered
in New Delhi under ICC rules was recognized as final and binding on
the parties.' A petition to stay the proceedings was dismissed by the
Indian Supreme Court on November 17, 1970.'15
VI. CRITIQUE OF THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
The benefits of accession to the Convention by the United States are
many. A country which at one time enforced American awards only
through a long and tedious process will now, if it has acceded to the
Convention, use the Convention's summary enforcement procedures.
The procedures are uniform among all states which are parties to the
Convention, and a person desiring to enforce his award need only
comply with article IV of the Convention. Countries which previously
did not enforce American awards are now required to do so.
Businessmen going abroad to have their awards enforced will have a
better idea of what to expect and what defenses, under article V, para-
graphs I and 2, will be available against them. They will also have an
easier time in securing enforcement since the burden of proving the
defenses of article V will be on their opponents.
However, there are some weaknesses in the Convention. First, under
article V(2)(b), the enforcing court can refuse to enforce the award on
public policy grounds. The practical effect of this provision is not
known, but political forces may be influential. It should be noted that
in the Curaqao case, the defendant raised this very point, alleging that
enforcement of the Curaqaoan award would be contrary to American
public policy.
When a court refuses without justification to enforce a foreign award,
it is unclear what will happen because there are no penalties for
improper nonenforcement. However, the state of the national whose
award has been denied enforcement might, under the broad reciprocity
clause of article XIV, refuse to entertain suits for enforcement of awards
,7' Judgment of May 25, 1970, 24 Wirtschafts- Wertpapier- und Bankrecht 1050 (Fed. Ct.).
' Suit No. 122 - A/70 (India).
,' Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2191/70 (India). Information on the use of the Convention
overseas is rather sparse. See Domke, The United States Implementation of the United Nations
Arbitral Convention, 19 AM. J. COMp. L. 575 (1971).
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brought by nationals of the state refusing enforcement.
Another problem is the different treatment accorded arbitral agree-
ments and arbitral awards. While article II deals with the recognition
of arbitration agreements, both the scope and reservation clauses (arti-
cles I(1) and 1(3), respectively) mention only the recognition and en-
forcement of awards. This may have been an oversight, and some of the
literature suggests that articles I and II, when read together, can be
interpreted to mean that the Convention requires arbitral agreements as
well to be enforced. 7 6
It should be noted that the Convention applies only to arbitral
awards, as the court held in the Curacao case, 177 thus leaving enforce-
ment of foreign judgments on those awards to the state laws. However,
even when there is a judgment, the Convention can be applied to the
underlying award, since the doctrine of merger is inapplicable here.
178
The United States has several bilateral FCN treaties with nations
which are also parties to the Convention, such as Germany and Japan.
The relative status of these two treaties is somewhat uncertain. How-
ever, it is certain that the FCN treaties remain important and will have
substantial effects on the enforcement of American awards, since the
treaties are based on the nationality of the parties, whereas the Conven-
tion is based on the place of the arbitration. The distinction makes it
important to choose the place of arbitration carefully. For example,
notwithstanding the fact that France is a party to the Convention, an
arbitral award made in London under an agreement between a French
corporation and a United States corporation would not be entitled to
recognition in the United States under the Convention, because the
United Kingdom has not acceded to the Convention. On the other hand,
it would come within the terms of the bilateral agreement with France.
Also, the FCN treaties remain important since some countries with
whom we have FCN treaties are not parties to the Convention.
The Convention has an additional point in its favor. Article I of the
Convention applies to awards arising out of differences between per-
sons, both physical and legal, and the United States has elected the
"commercial" reservation. 7 ' It appears that the Convention can be
applied to trade between American nationals and foreign countries. This
"I6 Wash. Comment, supra note 137, at 456, 458.
177 489 F.2d 1313, 1319 (2d Cir. 1973).
... Sargant v. Monroe, 268 App. Div. 123, 49 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1944); Oilcakes & Oilseeds
Trading Co. v. Sinason Teicher Inter Am. Grain Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 651, 170 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Sup.
Ct. 1958), affd, 7 App. Div. 2d 977, 183 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Ist Dep't 1959), affd, 8 N.Y.2d 852, 168
N.E.2d 708, 203 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1960).
M7 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1970).
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view was intimated in the Curacaolg" decision discussed above, where the
court stated that commerce, as used in the Convention, was meant to
be applied in its broadest sense.'' Thus, it appears that the Convention
may, in some instances, overlap with the CSID, but the latter is applic-
able only to investment disputes and only where there is a national of
one state and a host state party on either side. 82
Even though it has some deficiencies, the Convention is a workable
means by which arbitral agreements and awards can be enforced across
national borders. Although the Convention is not a panacea for all the
problems which enforcement of foreign awards entails, and although it
does not go as far as some desire in creating an international arbitration
tribunal,'3 it is at least a practical, realistic system that can operate in
today's world.
188 356 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
181 Id. at 13; see Quigley, supra note 54, at 1061. See also Domke, The United States Implemen-
tation of the United Nations Arbitral Convention, 19 AM. J. CoMp. L. 575, 579 (1971).
"82 See the discussion of the CSID in Island Territory of Curaqao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489
F.2d 1313, 1317-18 (2d Cir. 1973).
" See Domke, Establishing an International Commercial Arbitration Council: A Preliminary
Proposal, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 174 (1971).
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